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Abstract
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges
and spectrum auctions, there is a growing inter-
est in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided
markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truth-
ful, or do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal
gain-from-trade, or rely on a prior on the traders’
valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a
single kind of good. We extend the random market-
halving technique used in earlier works to markets
with multiple kinds of goods, where traders have
gross-substitute valuations. We present MIDA: a
Multi Item-kind Double-Auction mechanism. It is
prior-free, truthful, strongly-budget-balanced, and
guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when mar-
ket sizes of all goods grow to∞ at a similar rate.
1 Introduction
The recent auction for radio spectrum reallocation [Leyton-
Brown et al., 2017] has incited a surge of interest in double
auction mechanisms — mechanisms for arranging trade in
two-sided markets. Such markets differ from one-sided mar-
kets in that the valuations of both buyers and sellers are their
private information, and both sides might act strategically.
An important requirement from a double-auction is effi-
ciency, which is measured by its gain-from-trade (GFT) —
the total value gained by the buyers minus the total value
contributed by the sellers. As an example, consider a stock
market with two sellers: Alice holds a unit of stock x which
she values as 41 and Bob holds a unit of stock y which he
values as 46. There is a single buyer, George, who wants a
unit of a single stock which can be either x or y; he values
x as 47 and y as 48. Then, if George buys x from Alice the
GFT is 47− 41 = 6 while if he buys y from Bob the GFT is
48 − 46 = 2. Therefore, an optimal double-auction mecha-
nism would make the former trade. If the mechanism makes
the wrong trade, it attains only 1/3 of the optimal GFT. 1
A common double-auction mechanism is the Walrasian
mechanism [Rustichini et al., 1994; Babaioff et al., 2014].
1 Note that the social welfare — the sum of agents’ valuations
— is much easier to approximate than the GFT. E.g, in the above
example, the wrong deal attains 48+41
47+46
> 95% of the optimum.
It computes an equilibrium price-vector — a price for each
good, at which the supply of each good equals its demand:
the total number of units that sellers want to sell at this price
equals the total number of units that buyers want to buy at
this price. This mechanism attains the maximum GFT [Nisan
et al., 2007, Th. 11.13]. Unfortunately, it is not truthful —
traders may gain by reporting false valuations.
In fact, in a two-sided market, any truthful mechanism that
attains the maximum GFT cannot be budget-balanced (BB)
— the market-maker has to subsidize the trade [Myerson and
Satterthwaite, 1983]. Therefore, it is interesting to develop
double-auction mechanisms that are truthful, BB and attain
an approximately maximal GFT. We define the competitive
ratio of a mechanism as the minimum ratio (over all utility
profiles) of its GFT divided by the optimal GFT. The first
truthful and BB approximation mechanism was presented in
the seminal work of McAfee [1992]: Its competitive-ratio is
1 − 1/k, where k is the number of units traded in the op-
timal situation. (i.e, its GFT is always at least 1 − 1/k of
the maximum GFT). Thus, McAfee’s mechanism is asymp-
totically optimal — when the market-size k grows to infin-
ity, the GFT approaches the maximum. Another advantage of
McAfee’s mechanism is that it is prior-free (PF) — it does not
require any probabilistic knowledge on traders’ valuations; it
works even for adversarial valuations. Its main drawback is
that it works only in a single-good market when each trader
can trade a single unit.
Currently, as far as we know, no truthful mechanism at-
tains asymptotic optimality in a two-sided market with mul-
tiple kinds of goods (see related work in §1.3). Recently,
Segal-Halevi et al. [2018a] presented an truthful, BB, PF and
asymptotically-optimal mechanism for a single-good market
that allows many units per trader. It is called MUDA and is
based on a random-halving scheme:
Split the market into two sub-markets, left and right, by
sending each trader to each side with probability 1/2, in-
dependently of the others. Then, in each sub-market:
1. Calculate a Walrasian equilibrium price (pR at the
right, pL at the left).
2. Let the traders trade at the price from the other mar-
ket (pL at the right, pR at the left).
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The competitive ratio of MUDA is 1−O(M
√
ln k
k ), where
k is again the total number of units traded in the optimal situ-
ation and M is the maximum number of units per trader.
The goal of this paper is to break the single-good barrier
and attain truthful, BB, PF and asymptotic optimality in a
multi-good market. We show that is is possible to extend the
random-halving scheme of MUDA to multi-good markets.
We call the extended version MIDA — Multiple Item-kind
Double Auction. However, the extension is not trivial and
requires several additional assumptions, presented below.
1.1 Truthfulness in a Multi-Good Market
First, since step 1 of MUDA calculates Walrasian equilibria,
extending it requires that a Walrasian equilibrium exists. Gul
and Stacchetti [1999] prove that a sufficient condition for the
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is that all traders’ valu-
ations satisfy a condition called gross-substitute (GS).
The GS condition means that, if an agent wants to buy a
good x and the price of another good y increases, the agent
still wants to buy x (so the demand for good x weakly in-
creases). A typical example of a GS market is a market for
used cars: usually, people consider cars of different models
to be substitutes, so when the price of one model increases,
the demand for other models weakly increases.
Second, step 2 of MUDA lets traders trade in a price that is
not an equilibrium price at their own market, so it must handle
excess demand and supply. In a single-good market this is
easy since there is excess only in one side of the market, so
it can be solved using randomization. In a multi-good market
this is harder since in each side we can have excess demand
in some goods and excess supply in other goods.
Currently we know to solve this problem for markets in
which only one of the two sides can trade multiple goods. For
concreteness, we assume that the buyers can trade multiple
goods while each seller sells multiple units of a single good.
Under these two assumptions, MIDA works as follows.
Halve the market randomly (like MUDA). In each half:
1. Calculate a Walrasian equilibrium price-vector — a
price for each good-kind (pR at the right, pL at the left).
2. Let the traders trade at the price-vector from the
other market (pL at the right, pR at the left) as follows:
• For each good-kind x, put all the sellers of x in a
queue, ordered randomly. For each x-seller, calcu-
late the number of x-units that maximize his gain at
the market price-vector; sum all these numbers to
get the aggregate supply of x.
• Put all buyers in a single queue, ordered randomly.
For each buyer i in the buyers’ queue, calculate the
bundle that maximizes his net gain at the market
price-vector, among all bundles that are contained
in the aggregate supply. Let the buyer buy this
bundle from the first sellers in the sellers’ queues.
Whenever a first seller exhausts his optimal supply,
he leaves the market and the next seller in this queue
becomes first.
Theorem 1. Suppose each seller sells multiple units of a sin-
gle good, and all traders have gross-substitute valuations.
Then, MIDA is strongly budget-balanced (= has no deficit
and no surplus) and truthful. Moreover, these properties hold
ex-post — for every outcome of the randomization.
Proof. Strong budget-balance is obvious since all monetary
transfers are between buyers and sellers. We now prove that
this mechanism is truthful for every randomization outcome.
The buyers effectively play random-serial-dictatorship,
which is known to be truthful. Whenever it’s a buyer’s turn to
buy a bundle, the mechanism picks for him the best possible
bundle given the available supply.
The sellers have GS valuations. Gul and Stacchetti [1999]
prove that GS valuations are submodular. This means that
a seller gains the highest utility from selling the first unit, a
lower utility from selling the second unit, etc. Hence, for each
seller there is an optimal number of units to sell in the given
market-prices, and it is always optimal for a seller to sell as
many units as possible up to the optimal number, then leave.
This is exactly what the mechanism does for them.
Remark. (a) MIDA is truthful only for single-good sellers.
Consider a seller who can sell multiple goods. For example,
an additive seller who, in the market prices, gains 5 from sell-
ing x and 3 from selling y (and 8 from selling both). MIDA
has to let such a seller participate simultaneously in both
seller-queues. Suppose there is a single unit-demand buyer
who gains 6 from buying x and 8 from buying y. If the seller
reports truthfully then the buyer buys y. But the seller can
strategize by claiming that he loses from selling y (i.e, stand-
ing only in the queue of x-sellers); then the buyer will be
forced to buy x and the seller will gain more.
(b) MIDA is truthful only for submodular sellers. Consider
a non-submodular seller. For example, a seller who values a
single unit as 10 and two units as 40. If the market price is
25 per unit, then the seller gains -5 from selling a single unit
ans +10 from selling two units. Suppose the first buyer in the
buyers’ queue wants a single unit. The best response of the
seller depends on the preferences of the following buyers: if
another buyer wants a unit then it is best to truthfully report a
supply of 2, but if no other buyer wants a unit then it is best
to untruthfully report a supply of 0.
1.2 Asymptotic Optimality in a Multi-Good
Market
Asymptotic optimality means that, when the market is suffi-
ciently large, the GFT approaches its maximum value. We
have to define what is meant by “large market”. The defini-
tion implied by McAfee [1992] is that k — the number of
units traded in the optimal situation — approaches infinity.
This definition cannot be used as-is in a multi-good market.
As an extreme example, suppose the market has two indepen-
dent goods x and y, where most GFT comes from trading a
single unit of x, but the market-size of y approaches infinity.
It is clear that the competitive ratio will not approach 1 in this
case. Therefore, we extend the “large market” definition as
follows. Let G be the number of different good-kinds. For
any good-kind x ∈ {1, . . . , G}, let kx be the total number of
units of x traded in the optimal situation. A large market is
a market where for all x, kx → ∞. To ensure that not all
these units come from few large traders, we also assume that
the number of units traded by a single person is bounded by
a constant M (a similar assumption is used in MUDA).
Surprisingly we found out that, even in a large market,
the random halving technique might attain sub-optimal GFT.
This can happen when the market-size in one good is much
larger than the market-size in another good. Appendix A
shows a concrete example where G = 2 and M = 1 but the
GFT is at most 63/64 of the maximum even if ∀x : kx →∞.
Intuitively, The random halving process creates an imbal-
ance in the number of traders in the two market-halves. Stan-
dard tail bounds tell us that, with high probability, the imbal-
ance is in the order of square-root of the number of traders
sampled. With one good, this imbalance is negligible as√
k/k → 0 when k → ∞. However, if we have two goods
x and y and
√
kx > ky , then the sample deviation in x might
destroy all the trade in y.
The example in Appendix A is interesting, since the
random-halving technique has been used successfully in var-
ious domains [Goldberg et al., 2001; Goldberg et al., 2006;
Devanur et al., 2015; Balcan et al., 2008; Balcan et al., 2007;
Devanur and Hayes, 2009], and one could think it is an
omnipotent technique. Our example shows the limitations
of random-halving and illustrates the inherent difficulties in
multi-good markets.
In contrast to this negative example, we prove that MIDA
is asymptotically-optimal when the market sizes in all goods
go to infinity in a similar rate. We define kmin := minx kx
and kmax := maxx kx and c := kmax/kmin = the largest
ratio between the market-sizes of different goods. Then:
Theorem 2. Suppose all traders have GS valuations. Then
the expected competitive ratio of MIDA is at least:
1− 18 ·M2G+2 · c · ln (10Gkmax)√
kmax
− o(1/kmax)
where G is the number of good-kinds, M the maximum
number of units of a single good traded by a single per-
son, kmax the largest market-size of a single good, and c =
kmax/kmin = the largest ratio between market-sizes.
Note that previously it was not known if asymptotic opti-
mality is possible even with two goods (G = 2). Therefore,
it is encouraging that we can get asymptotic optimality for a
constant number of goods.
The assumption that c is bounded means that, as the pop-
ulation grows, the market-sizes in the different good-kinds
grow at a similar rate. It is reasonable if we believe that the
ratio between market-sizes depends on some characteristics
of the population that remain approximately constant when
the population grows. This is analogous to the thickness as-
sumption introduced e.g. by Kojima and Pathak [2009] in the
context of two-sided matching.
This assumption can be weakened in two ways.
First, the parameter c may depend on kmax. Specifically,
if c = kmaxr where r < 0.5 (so kmin ≥ kmax1−r) then the
competitive ratio guaranteed by Theorem 2 is still 1− o(1).
Second, it is possible to replace c with a different param-
eter — h — the ratio of the largest to the smallest marginal
gain from a deal in a single item. We assume that the traders’
valuations are normalized such that, whenever a seller sells an
item to a buyer, the marginal GFT contributed by this deal is
between 1 and h. This assumption comes from the random-
halving literature (e.g. Goldberg et al. [2001]). There, it is
common to assume that the valuation of each buyer with pos-
itive valuation is bounded in [1, h], so that each buyer con-
tributes at most h to the total welfare. Our definition is the
natural generalization of this assumption to a two-sided mar-
ket.
Theorem 3. Suppose all traders have GS valuations. Then
the expected competitive ratio of MIDA is at least:
1− 18 ·M2G+2 ·G · h · ln (10Gkmax)√
kmax
− o(1/kmax)
where G is the number of good-kinds, M is the maximum
number of units of a single good traded by a single person,
and the marginal gain from each unit traded is in [1, h].
So when M and G are bounded, and either c or h (or both)
are bounded, and kmax →∞, The GFT of MIDA approaches
its maximum value.
Note that MIDA does not have to know the parameters used
in Theorems 2 and 3 (M,G, c, h, kmax, etc.); they are used
only in the analysis. The mechanism itself is prior-free.
Note also that Theorems 2 and 3 do not need the assump-
tion that each seller sells a single good-kind. This assumption
is needed only for the truthfulness (see Theorem 1 and the
following remark).
Paper layout. Related work is surveyed below. Formal
model is presented in Section 2. Theorems 2 and 3 are proved
in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the limitations of our results
and presents directions for future work.
1.3 Related Work
Mechanisms for multi-unit double auction are surveyed in
Segal-Halevi et al. [2018a]. Below we survey more advanced
mechanisms that handle multi-good markets.
1. Feng et al. [2012] present TAHES — Truthful double-
Auction for HEterogeneous Spectrum. The mechanism is
inspired by the problem of re-allocating radio frequency-
spectrum from primary owners to secondary users. In their
setting, each seller (primary owner) has a single unit of a
unique good-kind, each buyer (secondary user) has a differ-
ent valuation for each kind, and each buyer wants a single
unit. This is similar to a special case of our setting, in which
all buyers have unit-demand valuations. The authors do not
analyze the competitive ratio of their mechanism. 2
2. Blumrosen and Dobzinski [2014] present two Combina-
torial Reallocation mechanisms for multi-good markets. The
first one attains a competitive ratio of 1/[8 ·Θ(logM)] where
M is the maximum number of items per single seller, but it
2In fact, many double-auction papers related to frequency-
spectrum reallocation do not provide a theoretic analysis of their
GFT. Some of them provide simulations based on data specific to the
frequency-spectrum domain, and it is not clear how they perform in
other domains.
is not prior-free since it needs to know the median value of
the initial endowment of each seller. The second one is prior-
free and attains a competitive ratio of 1/48. Both competitive
ratios do not approach 1.
3. Gonen et al. [2007] present a general scheme for con-
verting a truthful mechanism with deficit to a truthful mecha-
nism without deficit. Their scheme can handle combinatorial
double auctions, but only when traders are single-valued, e.g,
when each trader has a set of desired bundles and values all
these bundles the same.
4. Chu and Shen [2006] present a double-auction mech-
anism that can handle multiple goods. However, its truthful-
ness depends on substitutability conditions between buyers to
buyers, sellers to sellers, and buyers to sellers. It is not clear
whether these conditions hold in our setting. Moreover, they
do not analyze the competitive ratio in a multi-good market.
5. Colini-Baldeschi et al. [2017b] present a combinatorial
double-auction mechanism in a Bayesian setting (not prior-
free). In contrast to our work, they approximate the social
welfare rather than the gain-from-trade. Note that any mech-
anism that attains a fraction α of the optimal GFT also attains
a fraction of at least α of the optimal social welfare [Brustle et
al., 2017; Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2017a], but the opposite is
not true. Moreover, their competitive ratios (1/4, 1/6 or 1/16)
do not approach 1.
6. Gonen and Egri [2017] present a combinatorial dynamic
double-auction mechanism that relies on partial prior infor-
mation — the maximum and minimum values of the traders.
They, too, approximate the social welfare rather than the
GFT: they show by simulations that their mechanism attains
about 0.5 of the maximum social welfare.
7. Hirai and Sato [2017] present a double-auction mecha-
nism for budgeted buyers, that is Pareto-optimal and truthful
for the buyers, but not truthful for the sellers.
2 Model
Traders and Valuations. We consider a market in which
some traders, the “sellers”, are endowed with discrete goods,
and other traders, the “buyers”, are endowed with unlimited
money. There are G different kinds of goods and each trader
can hold at most M units of each good, for some constants
G and M . A bundle is a vector X ∈ {0, . . . ,M}G. The
empty bundle is denoted by ∅ = (0, . . . , 0). A price-vector is
a vector p = (p1, . . . , pG). The price of a bundle X is p ·X .
Each trader i has a value function vi on bundles, normal-
ized such that vi(∅) = 0. All traders’ utilities are quasi-linear
in money, so the net gain of a buyer i from buying a bundle
X at price p is ui(X,p) = vi(X)− p ·X .
For each seller j with initial endowment Ej , we define
a sale-value function v′j on negative bundles: v
′
j(−X) :=
vj(Ej) − vj(Ej − X). Hence the net gain of seller j from
selling a bundle X at price-vector p is uj(−X,p) = p ·X −
v′j(−X). Note that the gain from no trade is 0 both for a
buyer and a seller: ∀i,p : ui(∅,p) = 0.
We present the gain of a trader as a sum of marginal gains,
in which there is a term for each unit traded, ordered from
good 1 to good G. For example, for a buyer who buys two
units of good 1 and one unit of good 2, the net gain is:
ui([2, 1],p) =ui([1, 0],p)+
[ui([2, 0],p)− ui([1, 0],p)]+
[ui([2, 1],p)− ui([2, 0],p)].
We present each trader as a set of at mostMG virtual traders,
each of whom trades a single unit and enjoys the marginal
utility of that unit (a similar idea was used by Chawla et
al. [2010]). So the above buyer represents three virtual buy-
ers: the first buys good 1 and gains ui([1, 0],p), the second
buys good 1 and gains ui([2, 0],p) − ui([1, 0],p), and the
third buys good 2 and gains ui([2, 1],p)− ui([2, 0],p).
Demand and Supply. We assume that traders’ valuations
are generic, i.e, values of different bundles and of different
traders are different and linearly-independent over the inte-
gers (no linear combination with integer coefficients equals
zero). This assumption guarantees that, given a price-vector
pR determined in the right market, every trader i in the left
market has a unique bundle that maximizes ui(·,p), and vice
versa.3 We call this maximizing bundle the demand of i at p.
If i is a seller then his demand is a weakly-negative vector;
we call the absolute value of this vector the supply of i at p.
Gross Substitutes. We assume that all traders’ valuations
are gross-substitute (GS); see Kelso and Crawford [1982] and
[Gul and Stacchetti, 1999] for formal definitions. Intuitively,
GS means that there are no complementarities between dif-
ferent items, so that when the price of a single unit of a single
good increases, the demands for the other units and the other
goods do not decrease. For example, suppose at price-vector
p the demand of some buyer is [2, 1], e.g, two units of good
x and one unit of good y. Suppose that the price of the first
unit of x increases while the prices of the other units remain
fixed. GS means that the buyer will still want to buy at least
one unit of x and one unit of y.
When all traders have GS valuations, a Walrasian equilib-
rium exists and can be found efficiently using an ascending
auction [Gul and Stacchetti, 2000; Ben-Zwi et al., 2013]. In-
tuitively, the GS property guarantees that the auctioneer can
increase the prices of over-demanded items, without creating
a demand-shortage in other items, until the market converges
to an equilibrium.
GS valuations are always submodular; see Gul and Stac-
chetti [1999] for a formal definition and a proof. Intuitively,
submodularity means that, if a trader loses some deals, its
marginal gain from the other deals weakly increases. For ex-
ample, if the buyer from above arrives at the head of the buy-
ers’ queue when only one unit of good 1 is available for sale,
then its gain from this unit will be ui([1, 0],p) which is at
least as large as ui([2, 0],p)−ui([1, 0],p), and its additional
gain from the unit of good 2 will be ui([1, 1],p)−ui([1, 0],p)
which is at least as large as ui([2, 1],p)− ui([2, 0],p).
3The genericity assumption can be dropped by using centralized
tie-breaking, i.e, whenever a trader has two or more demands, the
market-manager may select one of them in a way that maximizes
GFT. See Hsu et al. [2016] for other ways to handle ties in markets.
Mechanisms. A mechanism is a (randomized) function that
takes the traders’ valuations and returns (1) a price-vector
p, (2) for each buyer(seller) i, the bundle Xi to buy(sell)
at p. A mechanism is materially-balanced if for each good,
the number of units bought equals the number of units sold:∑
i∈Buyers Xi =
∑
j∈Sellers Xj .
A mechanism is ex-post truthful, if a trader can never in-
crease his gain by pretending to have different valuations,
even when the trader knows in advance the outcomes of all
randomizations done by the mechanism.
Given a trading scenario in which each trader i buys/sells a
bundle Xi, the gain-from-trade (GFT) is the sum of gains of
all traders: GFT :=
∑
i∈AllTraders ui(Xi).
4
In a materially-balanced setting, the GFT does not depend
on the price-vector, since the prices are canceled in the sum-
mation; money is only transferred between buyers and sellers.
3 Competitive-Ratio Analysis
For truthfulness we had to assume that, in one side of the
market, each trader specializes in a single good. In the present
section we do not need this assumption — both buyers and
sellers can trade multiple goods and are entirely symmetric.
We first analyze the optimal trade, then the right sub-market
and finally the left sub-market.
3.1 Optimal Trade
By the gross-substitute assumption, there exists a Walrasian
equilibrium in the global population, and it attains the max-
imum GFT (see Section 2). By the genericity assumption,
the equilibrium allocation is unique. We call it the “optimal
trade” and denote any equilibrium price-vector by pO.
For any good x ∈ {1, . . . , G}, denote byBx∗ the set of vir-
tual buyers and by Sx∗ the set of virtual sellers participating
in the optimal trade. By definition of equilibrium, the num-
bers of virtual-traders in both groups are the same; this is the
number we denoted by kx:
∀x ∈ {1, . . . , G} : |Bx∗| = |Sx∗| = kx (1)
We call these virtual traders the efficient traders. We make
the pessimistic assumption that all GFT in the sub-markets
comes only from these efficient traders. Therefore, the GFT
of our mechanism depends on the numbers of efficient traders
that trade in each sub-market.
The reduction in GFT has two reasons: one is the sam-
pling error — efficient buyers and sellers land in different
sub-markets, so they do not meet and cannot trade. This error
is easy to bound using standard tail inequalities. The second
reason is the pricing error — the prices at the sub-market
might be too high or too low, which might create imbalance
in the demand and supply. Analyzing this error requires care-
ful analysis of the equilibrium in the optimal situation vs. the
equilibrium in each sub-market.
3.2 Right Sub-Market
In the right, we calculate an equilibrium price-vector pR. For
each good x ∈ {1, . . . , G}, define the sets of virtual-traders:
4 In some papers, the gain-for-trade is termed trader surplus or
price improvement [Chakraborty et al., 2015].
• Bx− is the set of efficient virtual buyers of x (members
of Bx∗) who do not demand x at p
R.
• Sx− is the set of efficient virtual-sellers (members of
Sx∗) who do not supply x at p
R.
• B+x is the set of inefficient virtual-buyers (not members
of Bx∗) who demand x at p
R.
• S+x is the set of inefficient virtual-sellers (not members
of Sx∗) who supply x at p
R.
We denote D+x := B+x ∪ Sx− and Dx− := Bx− ∪ S+x.
These sets D+x, Dx− represent the pricing error — they are
responsible for the loss of welfare due to efficient traders quit-
ting or inefficient traders competing with the efficient ones.
The goal of our analysis below is to bound the sizes of the
sets Dx− and D+x.
For any set T of traders, denote by TR the subset of T
that is sampled to the right market and by TL the subset of T
sampled to the left market. By definition of the equilibrium
price-vector pR, for every good x:
|BRx∗| − |BRx−|+ |BR+x| = |SRx∗| − |SRx−|+ |SR+x| (2)
In order to relate (1) and (2), we have to relate BRx∗, S
R
x∗ to
Bx∗, Sx∗. This is be done using the following lemma.
Lemma. For every set T of virtual-traders and integer q > 0
w.p. 1− 2 exp
( −2q2
M2|T |
)
:
∣∣∣∣|TR| − |T |2
∣∣∣∣ < q (3)
(“w.p. x” is a shorthand to “with probability at least x”).
The lemma is proved using Hoeffding’s inequality. The
proof is standard and we omit it.
We apply this lemma 2G times, to Bx∗ and Sx∗ for each
x ∈ {1, . . . , G}, and combine the outcomes using the union
bound. This gives, ∀q > 0:
w.p. 1− 4G exp
( −2q2
M2kmax
)
: (4)
∀x : ∣∣|BRx∗| − kx/2∣∣ < q and ∣∣|SRx∗| − kx/2∣∣ < q
Combining equations 1, 2 and 4 gives, ∀q > 0:
w.p. 1− 4G exp
( −2q2
M2kmax
)
: (5)
∀x : ∣∣|BRx− ∪ SR+x| − |BR+x ∪ SRx−|∣∣ < 2q
=⇒ ∣∣|DRx−| − |DR+x|∣∣ < 2q
Our goal now is to get a bound on |D+x|, |Dx−|. We proceed
in several steps.
Step A: From Bound on Difference to Bound on Sets.
Below we fix some q > 0 and assume that the suffix of
inequality (5) holds. This gives us an upper bound on∣∣|DRx−| − |DR+x|∣∣. We need upper bounds on |DRx−| and
|DR+x|. To get it, we use a property of GS valuations called
Downward Demand Flow (DDF) [Segal-Halevi et al., 2016].
Consider two price-vectors pO and pR, and let ∆ := pR −
pO = the vector of price-increases. Intuitively, DDF means
that a trader’s demand goes down the price-change ladder —
a trader switches from demanding good x at price pO to de-
manding good y at price pR, only if ∆x > ∆y .
Lemma (DDF Lemma, Segal-Halevi et al. [2016]). Ev-
ery trader with gross-substitute valuations has the following
property. Whenever the price-vector changes from pO to pR,
the trader’s demand changes in the following way.
(1) If the trader stopped demanding some good x with
∆x ≤ 0, then he started demanding a good y with ∆y < ∆x.
(2) If the trader started demanding some good xwith ∆x ≥
0, then he stopped demanding a good y with ∆y > ∆x.
See Figure 1 for an illustration of buyer-sets in a market
where all buyers have unit demand.
By combining the DDF lemma and (5), we can prove:
w.p. 1− 4G exp
( −2q2
M2kmax
)
: (6)
∀x ∈ {1, . . . , G} : |DRx−| < 2G · q & |DR+x| < 2G · q
Proof. We renumber the goods in ascending order of their
price change, such that x < y implies ∆x ≤ ∆y . In this
ordering of the goods, there are zero or more goods that be-
came cheaper, and then zero or more goods that became more
expensive. We prove (6) for goods that became cheaper; the
proof for goods that became more expensive is analogous.
We prove by induction on x that |DRx−| and |DR+x| are both
at most 2x−1 · 2q. The base is x = 1 — the item with the
largest price-decrease. By the DDF property, |DR1−| = 0. By
Inequality (5), |DR+1| < 2q.
For the induction step, assume the claim is true for all
good-kinds y < x. By the DDF property, every virtual-
trader inDRx− corresponds to a virtual-trader inD
R
+y for some
y < x. Therefore:
|DRx−| ≤
∑
y<x
|DR+y| <
∑
y<x
2y−1 · 2q = (2x−1 − 1) · 2q
By Inequality (5), |DR+x| < |DRx−| + 2q = 2x−1 · 2q. This
concludes the induction proof.
Since x− 1 < G, the lemma is proved.
Step B: From a Bound on Sampled Sets to a Bound on
Their Parent Sets. Our goal is now to derive from (6) an
upper bound on |Dx−| and |D+x| — the number of virtual
traders that change their demand or supply due to the pricing
error. These two sets are entirely analogous; we focus on
Dx−. First, we derive from (3) the following, by substituting
q → |T |/4:
∀ set T : w.p. 1− 2 exp
(−|T |
8M2
)
: |T | < 4|TR| (7)
We would like to apply (7) to Dx− and conclude that
|Dx−| < 2G4q. But we cannot do so directly since Dx− is
a random-set — it depends on the random-sampling through
pR — while T in (7) must be a deterministic set — inde-
pendent of the random-sampling. Our solution is to use the
union bound. Let Eq be the set of all possible values of Dx−
with cardinality 2G4q (soEq is a set of sets of virtual traders).
Figure 1: Buyer sets in a market with two goods (x and y)
and unit-demand buyers. Sellers are not shown. Each buyer
is denoted by a ball whose x-coordinate is the buyer’s valua-
tion to x and y-coordinate its valuation to item y. Prices are
denoted by points (px, py).
In the global market, the optimal price is pO. There are kx =
5 efficient x-buyers and ky = 5 efficient y-buyers.
The buyers are randomly divided to two markets. Buyers sam-
pled to the right market are shown below by solid balls and
the other buyers are empty balls. In the right market, the
equilibrium price is pR. In this price, there are 7 y-buyers:
BRy∗∪B+yR (pentagon to the top-left of pR) and 3 x-buyers:
BRx∗ \ BRx− ∪ BR+x (trapezoid to the right-bottom of pR).
Here, the order of price-changes is ∆y < ∆x < 0. Item y
is in the bottom of the ordering, so By− = ∅. Also, in accor-
dance with the DDF property, Bx− ⊂ B+y .
We apply (7) simultaneously to all sets in Eq using the union
bound. We get, for every integer q:
w.p. 1− 2|Eq| exp
(−2G4q
8M2
)
: ∀T ∈ Eq : 2Gq < |TR|
The same arguments are true for D+x and for every good
x ∈ {1, . . . , G}. Combining this with (6) gives, for every q:
w.p. 1− 4G exp
( −2q2
M2kmax
)
− 4G exp
(− ln |Eq| · 2G4q
8M2
)
:
∀x ∈ {1, . . . , G} : |Dx−| < 2G4q & |D+x| < 2G4q (8)
Step C: Bounding the Number of Possible Sets. Our goal
now is to find an upper bound on |Eq|. In fact, we will bound
|E| — the number of possible values of Dx−, regardless of
their cardinality. Initially, we bound |E| as a function of n
— the total number of real traders that come to the auction.
Then, we replace n by a function of kmax.
We present the set Dx− as a function of simpler sets. For
every two bundles Y and Z, denote by RYZ the set of
traders who, at price-vector pR, prefer bundle Y to bundle
Z. RYZ is a one dimensional random set: it contains all the
traders i for whom:
vi(Y )− vi(Z) > pR · Y − pR · Z
Therefore, for every integer t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is exactly
one possible value of RYZ with cardinality t — it is the
set of t traders for whom the difference vi(Y )− vi(Z) is the
highest among all n traders. Therefore the random set RYZ
has n possible values. The total number of sets RYZ is at
most the number of bundle-pairs, which is at most (MG)2 =
M2G. Hence there are at most nM
2G
ways to choose these
sets. Once all the sets RYZ are determined, the set Dx− is
completely determined too. Therefore:
|E| < nM2G (9)
We now want to replace n by an expression that depends only
on kmax. The reason is that n — the total number of traders
in the market — might be very large: in theory, every person
on Earth might come to the auction as a “trader” without buy-
ing or selling anything. Therefore, we cannot hope to get any
meaningful approximation factor based on n. Indeed, the ap-
proximation factors in the prior-free double-auction literature
since McAfee [1992] are given as a function of the number
of optimal deals (k), which is a better indicator of the actual
market size.
Define a relevant trader as a trader who trades at least one
unit of at least one good in at least one price-vector — pO
or pR. Our arguments for bounding |E| clearly hold when
we use the number of relevant traders instead of n. We will
now prove that, with high probability, the number of relevant
traders is at most n′, where n′ := 10Gkmax. Then we will
use this bound in (9) and get that |E| < (n′)M2G .
Lemma. w.p. 1− 2 exp
(
−2G2kmax ln (8Gkmax)
M2
)
, the number
of relevant traders is at most 10Gkmax.
Proof. By definition, the number of traders who want to trade
at pO is at most 2Gkmax. It remains to count the traders who
trade nothing at pO, but want to trade something at pR. Let
D0 be the set of these traders.
LetB0 (S0) be the set of the buyers (sellers) who have zero
demand (supply) at pO and non-zero demand (supply) at pR.
So D0 = B0 ∪ S0. By the DDF property, every buyer in B0
wants only goods x whose price decreased (∆x < 0), and
every seller in S0 offers only goods x whose price increased
(∆x > 0). Therefore, in the right market, each buyer in B0
buys only from a seller who also sells at pO (not in S0), and
every seller in S0 buys only from a buyer who also buys at
pO (not in B0). Hence: |DR0 | ≤ 2Gkmax.
We now want to prove that, with high probability, |D0| <
8Gkmax. We will use the union bound and apply (7) to all
possible values of D0 with cardinality 8Gkmax. We first have
to count these possible values. We observe that, by the DDF
property, the set B0 is completely determined by a union of
G one-dimensional sets:
⋃G
x=1R{x}∅. This is the set of all
virtual buyers who, at price-vector pR, prefer a single unit of
any good over the empty set. Similarly, the set S0 is com-
pletely determined by a union of G one-dimensional sets —
the set of all virtual sellers who, at price-vector pR, prefer to
sell a single unit of any good than to sell nothing. Therefore
the set D0 is a union of 2G one-dimensional sets. For every
integer t, the number of values of D0 with cardinality exactly
t is at most (t + 1)2G−1, since for each of the first 2G − 1
sets in the union, we have at most t + 1 options for select-
ing the number of elements they will contribute to the union
(once the number of elements is selected, the identity of these
elements is determined, since the set is one-dimensional).
Applying (7) simultaneously to all these sets with t =
8Gkmax gives:
w.p. 1− 2(8Gkmax + 1)2G−1 exp
(−8Gkmax
8M2
)
: |D0| < 8Gkmax
neglecting the “+1” and “-1” and inserting the coefficient into
the exponent gives the following approximation:
w.p. 1− 2 exp
(−2G2kmax ln (8Gkmax)
M2
)
: |D0| < 8Gkmax
Adding the at most 2Gkmax traders who want to trade in pO
gives the claimed upper bound of 10Gkmax = n′.
Substituting n → n′ in (9) and (9) in (8) gives the failure
probability:
4G exp
( −2q2
M2kmax
)
+ 4G exp
(
M2G lnn′ − 2
Gq
2M2
)
+2 exp
(−2G2kmax ln (8Gkmax)
M2
)
Denote this probability byPF(q). So by (8), w.p. 1−PF(q):
∀x ∈ {1, . . . , G} : |Dx−| < 2G4q and |D+x| < 2G4q
3.3 Left Sub-Market
For every good x, the set of efficient virtual-buyers in the left
market is BLx∗ = Bx∗ \BRx∗. All these virtual-buyers want to
trade at price pO; all the virtual-buyers who are not in Bx−
want to trade at price pR too. Therefore, the set of efficient
buyers who are sampled to the left market and want to trade
at the price-vector posted for the left market is: Bx∗ \ BRx∗ \
Bx−. Some of these buyers might be “wasted” by trading
with inefficient virtual-sellers; the set of inefficient virtual-
sellers who want to trade x at price pR is S+x. All in all, the
number of efficient virtual-buyers in the left submarket who
want to trade at price pR and are not wasted on inefficient
sellers is at least:
BLx :=|Bx∗| − |BRx∗| − |Bx−| − |S+x|
=kx − |BRx∗| − |Dx−|
Similarly, the number of efficient virtual-sellers who want to
trade at pR and are not wasted on inefficient buyers is at least:
SLx :=|Sx∗| − |SRx∗| − |Sx−| − |B+x|
=kx − |SRx∗| − |D+x|
By inequalities (4) and (8) from the previous subsection, we
have for every integer q, with probability 1− PF(q):
BLx ≥ kx/2− q − 2G4q
SLx ≥ kx/2− q − 2G4q
Thus, in the left market, at least kx/2 − q − 2G4q efficient
deals in good x are done. The same analysis is true in the right
market. Therefore, the total number of efficient deals in x
done in all submarkets is at least kx−2q−2G8q ≥ kx−2G9q.
From here we proceed to prove Theorems 2, 3.
Approximation Based on c. By the random ordering of the
traders in each market, the kx − 2G9q efficient deals exe-
cuted in the sub-markets are chosen at random from the set
of kx efficient deals. The same is true for every good-kind
x. We recall that, by submodularity, if a virtual-trader loses
a deal, then the marginal-gain of other virtual-traders of the
same real-trader do not decrease. Hence, with probability
1−PF(q), the expected competitive ratio is at least 1− 2G9qkmin .
Hence, with probability 1, the expected competitive ratio is at
least 1− 2G9qkmin − PF(q) =
1− 2
G9q
kmin
− 4G exp
( −2q2
M2kmax
)
− 4G exp
(
M2G lnn′ − 2
Gq
2M2
)
− o( 1
kmax
)
All our analysis so far holds simultaneously for every in-
teger q. Now we substitute q = M
2G+2
2G−1 · lnn ·
√
kmax. The
competitive ratio becomes:
1−18M2G+2
√
kmax lnn
′
kmin
− 4G exp
(
−2M
4G+2
2G−1
ln2 n′
)
−4G exp
(
−M2G lnn′[√kmax − 1]
)
− o( 1
kmax
)
We now substitute n′ → 10Gkmax and kmin → kmax/c. The
latter three expressions are clearly in o(1/kmax). Therefore
MIDA’s competitive ratio is at least as claimed in Theorem 2:
1− 18 ·M2G+2 · c · ln (10Gkmax)√
kmax
− o(1/kmax)
Approximation Based on h. Recall that in each good-kind
x, w.p. 1− PF(q), at most 2G9q deals are lost. By assump-
tion, each deal contributes to the GFT at most h. Therefore,
the total loss of GFT in all goods together is at most 2G9qGh.
On the other hand, by assumption, each deal contributes to the
GFT at least 1. Therefore, the optimal GFT in all goods to-
gether is at least kmax. Hence, w.p. 1 − PF(q), the relative
loss of GFT is at most 2
G9qGh
kmax
. Hence, w.p. 1, the expected
competitive ratio is at least 1− 2G9qGhkmax −PF(q). This is ex-
actly the same expression as in the previous paragraph, except
that the 1kmin in the denominator is replaced by
Gh
kmax
. There-
fore, by the same analysis as above we get that the expected
competitive ratio is at least as claimed in Theorem 3:
1− 18 ·M2G+2 ·G · h · ln (10Gkmax)√
kmax
− o(1/kmax)
4 Limitations and Future Work
Our goal in this work was to prove that truthful asymptotic
optimality is theoretically possible even with multiple kinds
of goods. While we proved this possibility, our work has sev-
eral limitations that should be handled in future work.
(1) MIDA requires that agents have gross-substitute valua-
tions. We do not know how to handle agents with more gen-
eral valuations, e.g, submodular. The main problem is that
a Walrasian equilibrium might not exist, so we cannot use
prices from one market to control trade in the other market.
(2) MIDA’s truthfulness (Theorem 1) requires that in one
side of the market (e.g. the seller side), each trader specializes
in a single good-kind. We do not know how to handle markets
where both sides trade multiple good-kinds. The impossibil-
ity result in Segal-Halevi and Hassidim [2017] implies that
this might be a hard problem even when the prices are fixed
exogenously.
(3) MIDA’s asymptotic optimality (Theorems 2,3) requires
that either the parameter c or the parameter h (or both) are
bounded. Even with these assumptions, the competitive ratio
guarantee becomes positive only for a very large market. E.g,
with M = 2, G = 2, c = 1, where the market-size in both
goods is k, Theorem 2 guarantees 1 − 1152 · ln (20k)√
k
, which
becomes positive only for k ≈ 750, 000, 000.
Often, the real-life performance of a mechanism is much
better than its theoretical worst-case guarantee. This was
shown empirically for MUDA [Segal-Halevi et al., 2018a]
and we believe this should be the case for MIDA as well.
However, currently it is very difficult to find data on multi-
good two-sided markets, since even the user-interface of such
markets (e.g. in stock exchanges) usually accepts only single-
good inputs. We hope that, once multi-good double-auction
mechanisms become available, two-sided markets will allow
multi-good inputs, which will then enable empirical research.
A Failure of Random Halving
This Appendix shows that the common random-market-
halving technique might fail to attain an asymptotically-
optimal gain-from-trade. In the example, there is a two-
good market where the numbers of traders are parametrized
Name Value x Value y # Total
Optimal
behavior # Right # Left
Behavior In pR:
1 = pRy ≤ pRx ≤ 6
Byy 0 9 2k4 Buy y k4 − d1 k4 + d1 Buy y
Bxy 9 9 2k − 1 Buy x k − 1− d2 k + d2 Buy y
Bxx k
100 0 1 Buy x 0 1 Buy x
Syy -
1 + i/k5
i = 1, . . . , 2k4 2k4 Sell y k4 + k + d3 k4 − k − d3
k4 + k − 1− d1 − d2
sell y;
1 is indifferent;
all others do nothing.
Sx∅
6 + i/k5
i = 1, . . . , 2k - 2k Sell x k + d4 k − d4
At most 1 is indifferent;
all others do nothing.
Table 1: Data for negative example.
by k. With constant probability (independent of k), random-
halving loses almost all the gain-from-trade even when k →
∞. Hence, the competitive ratio does not approach 1 even
when the market-sizes in both goods approach∞.
We consider a market for medications. There are two
goods (medications) denoted y and x:
• Good y is a medication for headache. It is produced by
a group Syy of 2k4 sellers who value it as ≈ 1. More
precisely, the valuation of seller i in this subset is 1 +
i/k5, for i ∈ {1, . . . , |Syy|}.
• Good x is a strong medication that can cure both
headache and a much more lethal disease. It is produced
by a group Sx∅ of 2k sellers, each of whom produces a
single unit and values it as ≈ 6: the valuation of seller i
in this subset is 6 + i/k5, for i ∈ {1, . . . , |Sx∅|}.
The groups of sellers are disjoint so all sellers are single-good
and single-unit. There are three groups of buyers (patients).
• Byy is a large group of headache patients, each of whom
wants a unit of y and values it as 9.
• Bxx contains a single patient who has the lethal disease
and must get x; he values it very highly — k100.
• Bxy is a group of patients with a mild disease that can
be cured by both x and y; each of them wants a single
unit of either x or y and values it as 9.
The valuations and numbers are summarized in Table 1. The
first three columns show the trader sets and their valuations.
The next two columns show the total number of traders in
each group, and what they do in an optimal equilibrium. All
sellers sell and all buyers buy; to balance the number of deals
in x, all the Bxy buyers buy x. The number of efficient deals
in both good-kinds is an increasing function of k.
The next two columns show the number of traders from
each group sampled to each sub-market. Here, the dj are ran-
dom variables and the only thing we require about them is that
dj ≥ 0. The probability of getting such a sample approaches
a constant independent of k:
• The probability that inByy at least half the members fall
in the left market (d1 ≥ 0) is 1/2; similarly forBxy, Sx∅.
• The probability that the member of Bxx falls in the left
market is 1/2.
• The probability that in Syy at least k4 + k members fall
in the right market is less than 1/2; however, because
k 
√
2k4, this probability converges to 1/2 as k →∞.
Additionally, we require that lowest-valued seller in Sx∅ —
the seller with value 6 + 1/k5 — falls in the right market.
The probability for this is 1/2. All in all, the probability of
having such a sample converges to 1/64 as k →∞.
We now calculate the equilibrium price-vector pR.
• The number of y-sellers is higher than the total number
of potential x-buyers. Therefore, pRy must be near 1, so
that the higher-valued sellers from Syy do not sell.
• If pRx is below 6 then no sellers from Sx∅ want to sell x;
if pRx is at least 6 then no buyers fromBxy want to buy x
(they prefer y). In both cases, no units of x are traded in
the right market. Therefore pRx is at most the value of the
lowest-valued seller in the right, which is 6 + 1/k5 (in
fact, pRx can be any number between p
R
y and 6 + 1/k
5).
When pR is applied in the left market, the price of x is too
low for the Sx∅ sellers so they do not sell at all. The supply of
x is 0 and the Bxx patient cannot buy the strong medication.
Almost all welfare is lost. Since this happens with probability
≈ 1/64, the competitive ratio is at most ≈ 63/64 — it does
not approach 1.
This disaster cannot happen in any of the following cases.
• It cannot happen when the ratio between the market-
sizes of the two goods is bounded by some constant c. In
this case, the probability that the sampling-error in Syy
is of the same order-of-magnitude as Bxy approaches 0
as k →∞. This is consistent with our Theorem 2.
• It cannot happen when the welfare contributed by a sin-
gle agent is bounded by some constant h. In this case,
the relative loss of welfare in the sampling scenario
above is h/Ω(k), which approaches 0 as k → ∞. This
is consistent with our Theorem 3.
• It cannot happen with single good-kind, even when most
welfare comes from a single buyer. In this case, as long
as k (the number of efficient deals) is sufficiently large,
there will be sufficiently many sellers willing to sell the
item in a price that the important buyer is willing to pay.
This is consistent with Segal-Halevi et al. [2018a].
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